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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK: THE
EFFECT OF THE NEW ARTICLE 240
I. Introduction
At common law there existed no right to discovery in criminal
cases.' Criminal discovery developed in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century when statutes were enacted in England
that introduced the use of a preliminary hearing." Most jurisdic-
tions in the United States, including New York, left the develop-
ment of criminal discovery to case law.3 For many years, however,
the lack of common law precedents and the philosophical objec-
tions of many judges prevented criminal defendants from obtaining
any prosecution evidence before trial.'
The most prevalent of the early objections to criminal discovery
was that the specter of severe penalties would motivate criminal
defendants to use discovery to conjure up perjured testimony and
to fabricate defenses.5 This argument was based on the traditional
1. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1850 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). In King v. Holland, 100
Eng. Rep. 1248 (K. B. 1792), the court of the King's Bench, in reaction to a motion for
discovery of a report on which the charges against the defendant were based, stated: "Nor
was such a motion as the present ever made; and if we were to grant it, it would subvert the
whole system of criminal law. . . . And if we were to assume a discretionary power of grant-
ing this request, it would be dangerous in the extreme, and totally unfounded on precedent."
Id. at 1249-50.
2. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1850 n.1, 1859 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). See generally
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found In Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 748
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]; Zagel & Can, State Criminal Discovery and the New
Illinois Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557 [hereinafter cited as Zagel & Can].
3. Comment, Discovery in New York: The Effect of The New Criminal Procedure Law,
23 SYRACUSE L. REy. 89 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Discovery in New York].
4. See, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.);
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953); People ex rel. Lemmon v. Supreme Court,
245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927) (Cardozo, C.J.). See also Goldstein, The State and the
Accused: The Balance of Advantage In Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1148, 1181 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
5. This argument against criminal discovery and those to follow are discussed in the fol-
lowing commentaries: Discovery In New York, supra note 3, at 89-90; Brennan, The Crimi-
nal Prosecution: Sporting Events of Quest For Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 289 [herein-
after cited as Brennan]; Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 557, 560-61; McKenna, Opening up
Criminal Discovery In New York, Memorandum and Proposed Statute Re Discovery, re-
printed in 1974 N.Y. Laws 1860-78 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as McKenna]; Committee
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notion that criminal defendants would lie or would call witnesses
who would lie.' A second objection was that criminal discovery
would result in the intimidation of prosecution witnesses.' It was
also argued that the existing procedural safeguards for the rights of
the criminally accused were more than adequate to protect defend-
ants and that any rights of discovery would only serve to prevent
the effective enforcement of the criminal law.8 Finally, opponents
of criminal discovery contended that the fifth amendment right
against self incrimination would practically preclude any effective
provisions for reciprocal discovery of defense material by the
prosecution.
These longstanding arguments against criminal discovery even-
tually came under criticism. One commentator characterized the
argument that criminal discovery by the defendant invited perjury
as a "hobgoblin" and a "complete fallacy" because there was no
evidence to show, that discovery in criminal cases would result in a
greater incidence of perjury and fabrication. ° In addition, the per-
on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedure of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Pre-trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 RECORD 710, 716 (1976) [herein-
after cited as ABA Report].
6. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). Indeed, it was this
distrust of criminal defendants which had been the underlying basis for the common law
rule that denied defendants the right to call witnesses or to testify in their own behalf. Id.
In England, criminal defendants were not given the right to call witnesses and to present a
defense until 1867. Traynor, supra note 2, at 753.
7. See sources.cited in note 5 supra.
8. Id. In United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), Judge Learned Hand
stated:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution
is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the honest outline of his defense. He
is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when
there is at least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he
should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see. . . . Our dangers do
not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted
by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime.
Id. at 649.
9. See sources cited in note 5 supra.
10. Brennan, supra note 5, at 290-91. One survey's empirical findings supported the con-
clusion that the fears of perjury, intimidation of witnesses, and reluctance of witnesses to
testify were largely unfounded. Knudson, Disclosure of Grand Jury Testimony, 60 F.R.D.
237, 360 (1973). In addition, it has been argued that there is an equal danger of perjury in
civil cases where discovery is allowed and that, in any event, it is the job of a skilled lawyer
to expose a witness who is committing perjury. McKenna, supra note 5, at 1870.
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jury argument was criticized as insulting the criminal defense bar
by implying that defense attorneys would encourage perjury once
discovery was obtained." It was also noted that the assumption
that defendants would lie assumes that they are guilty, a view con-
trary to the presumption of innocence." The claim that criminal
discovery would lead to intimidation of witnesses was answered
simply by pointing out that protective orders and other sanctions
could be administered in the discretion of the trial court based on
the circumstances of the particular case. 3 The contention that the
accused has the advantage in criminal prosecutions was answered
with the argument that the prosecution has all the investigative
advantages, especially in terms of manpower and facilities. 4 It was
also argued that the investigative superiority of the prosecution
and the right to seize evidence virtually precluded the need for re-
ciprocal discovery by the prosecution. 5 In addition, proponents of
criminal discovery argued that a criminal deferqdant, who if con-
victed would lose his liberty, should be accorded the same rights of
discovery as a civil defendant on the grounds of fairness and logic."
Finally, it was maintained that allowing discovery in criminal cases
would be consistent with the presumption of innocence because if
the defendant is presumed innocent he must also be presumed to
have no knowledge of the crime charged. 7
In addition to responding to the traditional objections to crimi-
nal discovery, proponents argued that criminal discovery would
produce numerous benefits. Proponents explained that pretrial dis-
closure would promote the ends of justice and the search for the
truth by ensuring that all relevant facts would be brought out at
trial and that the use of surprise tactics would be eliminated. 8
11. Brennan, supra note 5, at 291-92.
12. McKenna, supra note 5, at 1870.
13. Brennan, supra note 5, at 292.
14. Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 561. In addition, the accused has often given the
prosecution a statement or confession or has been made to appear in a line-up. Id. at 560.
15. Id. at 560. It should be noted that in urban areas police forces spend most of
their time patrolling the streets rather than investigating criminal activity; and it is the re-
sponsibility of grand juries to charge rather than investigate. Id. at 560 n.19.
16. Pye, The Defendant's Case For More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 83 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Pye]; Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 560.
17. Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 560.
18. Id. But see Pulaski, Criminal Trials: A "Search For Truth" or Something Else? 16
CrmM. L. BuLL. 41 (1980). This was the rationale for adopting discovery in civil cases. Zagel
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This would not only make the administration of criminal justice
more efficient, but also assure the defendant his right to a fair trial
by enabling him to prepare his case effectively.'" The goal of effi-
ciency was especially important in light of the continuing impor-
tance placed on plea bargaining in the criminal justice system.20
Pretrial discovery, it was argued, would enable an accused and his
counsel to weigh the evidence against him to determine whether to
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.2' Finally, it was claimed that
pretrial disclosure would alleviate the problems in trial preparation
posed by the fact that adequate investigation is sometimes difficult
or impossible for the defendant. In connection with this claim, it
was argued that affording defendants pretrial discovery rights
would help to balance the advantage held by the prosecution in the
superiority of its investigatory force.2"
Despite the persuasiveness of the arguments in favor of criminal
discovery, they were slow to find acceptance in the courts of New
York.24 In 1927, Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,25 had been able
to discern only "[tihe beginnings or at least the glimmerings" of a
criminal discovery doctrine.2 " In that case Chief Judge Cardozo af-
firmed a reversal of a trial court's order that the prosecution dis-
close certain evidence to the defense, holding that a defendant was
not entitled to pry into the state's evidence simply because it
would be helpful to him.27 Chief Judge Cardozo also stated, how-
ever, that "[tihe decision of this case does not require us to affirm
& Carr, supra note 2, at 560.
19. Pye, supra note 16; ABA Report, supra note 5, at 715; Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at
562.
20. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
21. Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 559.
22. Brennan, supra note 5, at 285-87; Zagel & Carr, supra note 2, at 560; Goldstein,
supra note 4, at 1182-83.
23. See note 22 supra.
24. This is not to imply that there was absolutely no discovery in criminal cases prior to
this time. In the actual practice of criminal prosecutions there was probably a good deal of
evidentiary material made available to defense attorneys by prosecutors who hoped that by
revealing part of their case the defendant would be persuaded to plead guilty, thereby saving
both the time and expense of a trial. Brennan, supra note 5, at 282. See also People v.
Bennett, 75 Misc. 2d 1040, 1045, 349 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513 (Erie County Ct. 1973).
25. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
26. Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
27. Id. at 34, 156 N.E. at 88.
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or deny the existence of an inherent power in courts of criminal
jurisdiction to compel the discovery of documents in furtherance of
justice.""
After Lemon, criminal discovery in New York developed on an
ad hoc basis resulting in inconsistent determinations. 9 The reason
for this was the absence of criteria more definite than "in further-
ance of justice."0 Some cases following Lemon continued to hold
that defendants in criminal cases had no right to discovery.', As
time went on, however, decisions of trial courts began to reflect a
more liberal trend, holding that it was within their "inherent dis-
cretionary power" to grant pretrial discovery to criminal defend-
ants in order to prevent injustice.2
The inconsistent and conflicting state of the case law involving
criminal discovery moved the New York State Legislature, when it
enacted the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in 1971, to include in it
article 240, which provided specific criteria for judges to follow in
granting discovery and expanded an accused's right to pretrial dis-
covery well beyond the most liberal pre-CPL case law.m In 1979,
the New York State Legislature repealed the original article 240 as
enacted in 1971 and replaced it with a wholly new article 240 which
became effective on January 1, 1980.11
The purpose of this Comment is to set forth the current status of
statutory discovery in criminal prosecutions in the State of New
28. Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
29. Discovery in New York, supra note 3, at 91; Comment, Discovery Procedures Under
New York's New Criminal Procedure Law, 38 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 164 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Discovery Procedures].
30. Discovery Procedures, supra note 29, at 164.
31. People v. Spina, 14 A.D.2d 505, 217 N.Y.S.2d 247 (4th Dep't 1961); People v. Golly,
43 Misc. 2d 122, 250 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Widziewicz v. Golding, 52 Misc. 2d 837,
277 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Dutchess County Ct. 1966); People v. Graziane, 46 Misc. 2d 936, 261
N.Y.S.2d 546 (Columbia County Ct. 1965); People v. Parkinson, 181 Misc. 603, 43 N.Y.S.2d
690 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1943); People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (Ct.
Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1938).
32. People v. Chirico, 61 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 305 N.Y.S.2d 237, 242 (Fulton County Ct.
1969). See Silver v. Sobel, 7 A.D.2d 728, 180 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't 1958); People v. Abba-
tiello, 46 Misc. 2d 148, 259 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1965); People v. Quarles, 44 Misc. 2d 955,
255 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1964); People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542
(Kings County Ct. 1958).
33. 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 996 (McKinney) (repealed 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 412, § 1)
(McKinney) [hereinafter cited as CPL].
34. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 412 (McKinney).
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York.Y Part II of this Comment will detail what evidence was dis-
coverable under the original article 240 and the procedures by
which it could be obtained. Part III will present a number of the
significant case law problems that arose under the original article
240. Part IV will analyze the effectiveness of the newly enacted
statute in addressing these problems and in offering a comprehen-
sive guideline to criminal discovery in New York.
II. Discovery Under the Original Article 240
The original article 240 was, in large measure, an adoption of
rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."8 Rule 16 estab-
lished precise and liberal guidelines for criminal discovery in the
federal courts .3  Article 240 was designed to do the same in New
York."8 The goal of the original article 240, and that of Federal Rule
16, was to allow the defendant an opportunity to adequately pre-
pare for trial while not hindering the prosecutorial function. 3
Article 240, as passed in 1971, permitted a defendant against
whom an indictment was pending, to make a motion for discov-
ery.'" In order for the motion to be granted, the defendant had to
35. There are numerous ways and methods by which both the defense and the prosecu-
tion become aware of each other's evidence which are not covered by article 240. For in-
stance, discovery is often obtained through the use of subpoenas, in the process of prelimi-
nary hearings, and in even more informal ways. In addition, there are sections in the CPL
other than the discovery article which provide for exchanges between the defense and prose-
cution, including a bill of particulars supplied to the defendant by the prosecutor (N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.90 (McKinney Supp. 1979)), a notice by the defendant of intent to
rely on the defense of mental disease (Id. § 250.10), and a bill of particulars supplied by
the defendant upon the prosecutor's demand where the defendant intends to use an alibi
defense (Id. § 250.20). These methods will not be discussed in this Comment. There is also
a large body of case law involving the discovery of an informant's identity. This case law has
not been codified and will therefore not be discussed in this Comment in order to focus spe-
cifically on discovery under the CPL's discovery provision. For a good discussion of discovery
of an informant's identity, see Note, 39 ALB. L. REV. 561 (1975).
36. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 240, commentary (McKinney 1971) (repealed 1979) [here-
inafter cited as Practice Commentary]. New York courts that first dealt with discovery is-
sues under the original article 240 looked to federal case law on rule 16 to determine the
proper scope and interpretation to be given to article 240. See, e.g., People v. McMahon, 72
Misc. 2d 1097, 341 N.Y.S. 2d 318 (Albany County Ct. 1973); People v. Leto Bros., Inc., 70
Misc. 2d 347, 334 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Albany County Ct. 1972).
37. Practice Commentary, supra note 36.
38. Id. See also Discovery in New York, supra note 3, at 92-93.
39. Practice Commentary, supra note 36.
40. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20.
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act with due diligence." A motion made subsequent to the com-
mencement of trial could be summarily denied."2 The court, how-
ever, in the interest of justice and for good cause could grant a dis-
covery motion at any time before or during trial but prior to the
conclusion of the evidence." If the motion was granted, the court
would issue an order of discovery" directing the prosecution to al-
low the defendant to inspect the property requested."5 After com-
plying with an order of discovery, a party who found additional
property covered by the order would be required to promptly notify
his adversary or the court." Trial courts were given wide discretion
to remedy a failure to comply with a discovery order.47
The original article 240 exempted two kinds of material from
pretrial discovery." The first exemption protected "reports, memo-
randa or other internal documents or work papers made by district
attorneys, police officers or other law enforcement agents or by a
defendant or his attorneys, or agents, in connection with the inves-
tigation [and] prosecution . . .of a criminal action."" The second
exemption protected statements of witnesses and prospective wit-
nesses of both parties.50
Section 240.20 was the heart of the original article. This section
set forth the types of material discoverable in criminal cases.
Under subdivision one of this section, a defendant was entitled to
mandatory and unconditional discovery of his testimony given
before the grand jury that issued the indictment." A defendant
could also obtain any written or recorded statements made by him
to law enforcement personnel.52
41. Id. § 240.30.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 240.20.
45. Id. § 240.10(1). This included the right to copy or photograph the property. Id.
46. Id. § 240.40.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 240.10(3).
49. Id. § 240.10(3)(a).
50. Id. § 240.10(3)(b). Discovery of this material is not totally prohibited, but is actually
delayed until after the witness has testified at trial. In federal courts this practice is required
by the Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals adopted this
approach in People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448,
450, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 886 (1961).
51. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(1)(a).
52. Id. § 240.20(1)(b). There was no requirement in § 240.20(1) that the discoverable
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Under subdivision two of section 240.20, a court could order dis-
covery of reports of physical and mental examinations and scien-
tific tests made in connection with the defendant's case.53 Such
documents were discoverable if the district attorney knew or should
have known that they were in his possession.5 Unlike the uncondi-
tional and mandatory discovery provided for in subdivision one,
the discovery of material under subdivision two was discretionary
with the court and could be made conditional5 upon reciprocal dis-
covery by the prosecution of similar material within the defen-
dant's possession and whicl the defendant intended to produce at
trial.56 To avail itself of reciprocal discovery, the prosecution was
required to make a motion for discovery of material similar to that
requested by the defendant." This motion would be granted if the
prosecution could show that the property it sought was material to
the preparation of its case.58 In addition, the reciprocal request had
to be reasonable and could not involve exempt property.
Subdivision three of section 240.20 created a much "broader
classification" of discoverable material than did the first two subdi-
visions. 0 Under this subdivision, the court in its discretion could
order discovery by the defendant of "other property" within the
possession and control of the prosecution where the defendant
statements be admissible into evidence. Therefore, constitutionally inadmissible evidence
was discoverable. Discovery Procedures, supra note 29, at 170. The only limitations provided
for by section 240.20(1) were that the statements had to have been made to a law enforce-
ment official and that no discovery could be ordered as to statements made in the course of
an intercepted communication pursuant to an eavesdropping order.
53. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(2).
54. Id. § 240.20(2). If the prosecutor produced at trial a report which he purposely or
negligently failed to turn over to the defense before trial under a discovery order, the docu-
ment might have been excluded from evidence. Id. § 240.40. Discovery of physical and
mental examinations and scientific reports has generally been free of controversy. This is
due to the obvious importance of this material to the adequate preparation of the defen-
dant's case and the fact that such material is generally safe from alteration before trial. See,
e.g., People v. McMahon, 72 Misc. 2d 1097, 341 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Albany County Ct. 1972);
People v. Johnson, 68 Misc. 2d 708, 327 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Dutchess County Ct. 1971).
55. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(2).
56. Id. § 240.20(4). Discovery under subdivision two was also subject to protective orders
and in camera inspection by the court as provided for in section 240.20(5).
57. Id. § 240.20(4).
58. Id.
59. Id. It should be noted that although the defendant need not have alleged that the
material he sought would be admissible into evidence, the prosecution's reciprocal discovery
was limited to material which the defendant intended or was likely to produce at trial. Id.
60. Practice Commentary, supra note 36, § 240.20.
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showed that the property was material to the preparation of his
case and that the request was reasonable." This subdivision also
provided that such material could not be exempt property and had
to be specifically designated.2
III. Issues and Problems Under the Original Article 240
A. What Constitutes a Recorded Statement?
Under the original article's provision for automatic and uncondi-
tional discovery by the defendant of his own written or recorded
statements,03 it was unclear whether oral statements not written or
recorded were discoverable. A companion issue that arose was
whether the defendant could discover notes taken by a police of-
ficer of an oral statement made by the defendant. Also of impor-
tance was whether summaries of oral statements contained in ex-
empt property, such as police reports, could be discovered. Section
240.20(1)(b) did not address these issues."
61. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(3). An appellate division case, decided before the
original article 240 was enacted, based its decision on requirements similar to those later to
be included in section 240.20(3). In People v. Cleary, 33 A.D.2d 814, 305 N.Y.S.2d 384 (3d
Dep't 1969), the court stated that: "[T]o be entitled to any additional information from the
file of the prosecution there must be some demonstration that it exists and is material and
necessary for his defense." Id. at $14-15, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
62. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(3).
63. Id. § 240.20(1)(b). See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
64. An additional, though relatively minor, issue arising under section 240.20(1)(b) in-
volved the limitation contained in that section that defendant's discoverable statements
must have been made to public servants engaged in law enforcement activity or persons
acting in cooperation with them. See note 52 supra. The Federal Rule contains no reference
to law enforcement agents. FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a). Early federal case law interpreted this
provision to mean that virtually all statements were discoverable whether or not they were
made to a law enforcement official. United States v. Sink, 56 F.R.D. 365, 369 (E.D. Pa.
1972); United States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1967). In New York, the
question was raised whether persons not within the definition of "police" or "peace" officers
(CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 1.20 (33)-(34)) could be considered law enforcement officials so
that statements made to them were discoverable. An early court of appeals case held that
statements made to a private citizen who was working closely with authorities were properly
discoverable. People v. Rupert, 26 N.Y.2d 437, 259 N.E.2d 906, 311 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1970). A
later lower court case held that a town building official was "a public servant engaged in law
enforcement activity" on the grounds that such officials were responsible for enforcing build-
ing codes and town ordinances. People v. Brogan, 70 Misc. 2d 282, 332 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Dist.
Ct. 1972). In People v. Bennett, 75 Misc. 2d 1040, 349 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a case
involving a prisoner uprising at Attica State Prison, the court held that the limitation on
section 240,20(1)(b) should be accorded a very broad interpretation and allowed discovery of
defendants' statements made not only to police or correction officers, but also to deputy
sheriffs, medical personnel, monitors, members of the National Guard and prison staff. Id.
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Several cases prior to the enactment of the CPL addressed the
issue of whether oral statements were discoverable. In People v.
Riley,5 the court denied the defendant's motion for discovery of an
alleged oral admission and held that he was entitled to discover
only "confessions or admissions written by defendant himself or
signed by defendant or in such question-answer form as would be
admissible as an exhibit . . . ."I The court stated that where a
defendant has given "an oral admission, whether or not a police
officer has made a note thereof or given the substance or content
thereof in some paper for the use of the District Attorney, there is
no 'copy' which can be furnished to defendant's counsel in ad-
vance." 7 Similarly, in People v. Cusano," the court denied a mo-
tion for discovery of a defendant's oral statements, ruling that "an
alleged oral statement has no legal existence until and as testified
to by [a] witness.""
Relying on these pre-CPL cases, several cases subsequent to the
passage of the original article 240 continued to hold that defend-
ants' oral statements were not discoverable. 0 Other New York
courts, however, took a more expansive view of the statute. In Peo-
ple v. Zacchi,7' the defendants moved, pursuant to section
240.20(1)(b), for discovery of tape recordings of bribe offers which
they had allegedly made to police officers." The court granted the
motion, maintaining that statements by defendants discoverable
under section 240.20(1)(b) were not "limited to recitals of past oc-
at 1051-52, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 519. In a more recent case, a zoning inspector was, held to be
engaged in law enforcement activity within the meaning of section 240.20(1)(b). People v.
Wayman, 82 Misc. 2d 959, 371 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Just. Ct, 1975). The newly enacted article 240
retains the requirement that discoverable statements have been made to persons "engaged
in law enforcement activity." 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 412, sec. 2, § 240.20(1)(a) (McKinney).
Further problems with this limitation, however, should abate in light of the above case law
interpreting the limitation broadly to include almost all civilians acting in close coopera-
tion with the police.
65. 46 Misc. 2d 221, 258 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
66. Id. at 223, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
67. Id. Accord, People v. Cohen, 60 Misc. 2d 706, 708, 303 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (Richmond
County Ct. 1969).
68. 63 Misc. 2d 906, 313 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Nassau County Ct. 1970).
69. Id. at 908, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
70. People v. Gaissert, 75 Misc. 2d 478, 480, 348 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (Nassau County Ct.
1973); People v. Thomas, 71 Misc. 2d 1069, 1072, 338 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Nassau County Ct.
1972).
71. 69 Misc. 2d 785, 331 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
72. Id. at 786, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
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currences, such as confessions," but included tape recordings of
"incriminating conversations such as bribe attempts."73 In People
v. Bennett,7 the court entertained a discovery motion made on be-
half of forty-three defendants involved in an inmate uprising at At-
tica State Prison.75 With respect to the defendants' motion for dis-
covery of their own statements, the Bennett court cited the Zacchi
decision with approval and held that "[t]he manner in which the
statement has been written or recorded is immaterial, and oral
statements of a defendant reflected or summarized in any report,
notes or memoranda, are subject to production without regard to
whether or not they are verbatim or substantially verbatim."7 The
Bennett decision also provided that to the extent that the report or
memorandum in which the defendant's statements were contained
was considered exempt property under section 240.10(3)(a),77 the
material could be redacted before discovery by the defendant."
The Bennett decision was expressly accepted in two subsequent
cases. In People v. Harrison,"9 the defendant moved for discovery of
the handwritten notes made by police of his conversations with
them after his arrest for drunken driving. 0 The court granted the
motion stating that if notations of a defendant's oral statements
"are summarized, abridged, referred to, or reflected in any book,
record or paper . . .they are subject to discovery."', In People v.
Wyssling,82 a defendant charged with perjury arising out of alleged
discrepancies between his grand jury testimony and statements he
made during a previous interview with the district attorney moved
to discover the notes of the interview. 3 The court rejected the dis-
trict attorney's contention that the notes of the interview with the
defendant were exempt, stating that "[1]aw enforcement officers
. . .are not to limit the mandatory discovery rights of a defendant
merely by placing discoverable material with other matter into a
73. Id. at 787-89, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
74. 75 Misc. 2d 1040, 349 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
75. Id. at 1044, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
76. Id. at 1051, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
77. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
78. 75 Misc. 2d at 1051, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
79. 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Just. Ct. 1975).
80. Id. at 146, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
81. Id.
82. 82 Misc. 2d 708, 372 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975).
83. Id.
1979-801
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
report which is then characterized as exempt.""
Despite the preceding cases broad interpretation of section
240.20(1)(b) allowing discovery of statements recorded in notes or
contained in reports which were arguably exempt material under
section 240.10(3)(a), it was several years before a court explicitly
held that oral statements were discoverable." The first case which
expressly granted discovery of unrecorded oral statements was Peo-
ple v. Utley." In that case, the defendant moved to discover both
his written and oral statements. 7 The court granted the motion
stating that it was "inclined to view the difference between oral
and written statements as one of mere form rather than sub-
stance." 8 The court directed the prosecution to "reduce to writing
the substance of those oral statements, not already written or re-
corded."89 The Utley court based its decision on the same reasoning
utilized by the courts and the legislature in providing for discovery
of written or recorded statements;" that is, prosecutorial disclosure
of the defendant's oral statements is important to ensure that de-
fendant's rights to due process and representation by counsel would
not be denied.' The Utley court reiterated the view expressed in
Bennett that the manner of recordation was immaterial and that
the exempt material could be redacted if the recording was con-
tained in an exempt report or memorandum. 2
Those cases that considered the manner of recordation to be im-
material were reasonably consistent with the statute's provision for
discovery of "written and recorded" statements. 3 The Utley hold-
ing, however, that oral statements were discoverable, was inconsis-
tent with the express terms of section 240.20(1)(b) which made no
84. Id. at 710, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
85. The closest any case had come to such a holding was in People v. McMahon, 72
Misc. 2d 1097, 341 N.Y.S.2d 318 (County Ct. 1972), where, without opinion, the court
granted a motion for discovery of "a transcription of oral statements ... reduced to writing
or if not so reduced, then to provide the defense with the substance of the latter state-
ments." Id. at 1098-100, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 318-20. Such a holding was tantamount to recog-
nizing oral statements to be discoverable.
86. 77 Misc. 2d 86, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Nassau County Ct. 1974).
87. Id. at 87, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
88. Id. at 94, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
89. Id. at 97, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
90. Id. at 94, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 312-13.
91. Id. at 89-94, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 308-13.
92. Id. at 89, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
93. See notes 71-84 supra and accompanying text.
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reference to oral statements. Indeed, the court in Utley did not
base its decision on any provision in the original article 240, but said
that it had
the inherent power to compel disclosure of evidence which is material and
relevant to the defense, or which is favorable to the accused, or where disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid delay in trial or to protect natural, essential basic
or constitutional rights of the defendant or where it is otherwise necessary to
guarantee a fair trial or in the interest of justice."4
Another case in which the court found that defendants could dis-
cover their unrecorded oral statements despite the fact that such
discovery was not expressly provided for in 240.20(1)(b) was People
v. Daniels.5 In Daniels, the court had ordered disclosure of all writ-
ten or recorded statements of the defendant." When the prosecu-
tion applied for a clarification of the order, the court held that un-
recorded oral statements were subject to discovery "in the court's
discretion where a proper showing of materiality to the preparation
of the defense and reasonableness of the request has been made,"
pursuant to section 240.20(3)." 7 Whether section 240.20(3) actually
supported the discovery of defendants' unrecorded statements, es-
pecially in light of the express requirement in section 240.20(1)(b)
of a "written or recorded statement," is unclear. What is clear,
however, is that in granting discovery to defendants of their own
statements, many courts simply refused to be restrained by the
statute.
B. Discovery Requests Outside the Scope of the Original Arti-
cle 240
Under section 240.20(3), defendants could make a motion for dis-
covery of "other property" within the possession of the prosecu-
tion." Upon such a motion, courts, in their discretion, had to deter-
mine if the defendant had satisfied the four requirements imposed
94. 77 Misc. 2d at 96, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
95. 82 Misc. 2d 780, 371 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 782, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 597. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. The
defendant in Daniels failed to make the required showing. Id. at 782-83, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
597-99.
98. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 95-97 supra and accom-
panying text for a discussion of People v. Daniels, a case which based its holding on section
240.20(3).
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by the section. The property requested had to be non-exempt prop-
erty, specifically designated, material to the preparation of the de-
fendant's case, and the request itself had to be reasonable." This
catch-all provision was theoretically the basis for many discovery
motions by defendants because it freed defense counsel to move for
discovery of property not otherwise discoverable under subsec-
tions one and two of section 240.20.100 In many cases, however, de-
fense counsel did not specifically base their discovery motions on
section 240.20(3) despite the fact that it was the only section in the
original article 240 under which the items requested could have
been discovered. In addition, most courts did not state that the mo-
tion was being decided under that section. Rather, defense coun-
sel would make broad omnibus motions'' for pretrial discovery
and courts would decide them on the basis of their inherent discre-
tionary power to advance the interests of justice. In so doing, courts
would often take into account such factors as the preservation of
the right to a fair trial and efficiency in the administration of crim-
inal justice.
Whether specifically stated as being made pursuant to section
240.20(3) or not, the resulting defense motions were both imagina-
tive and far reaching. Among these were requests for police and
other investigatory or prosecutorial reports, names and addresses of
prospective prosecution witnesses, grand jury testimony and state-
ments of prospective prosecution witnesses, and exculpatory evi-
dence. The ability of defendants to discover material not specifi-
cally stipulated as discoverable by the original article 240 will be
discussed in this section. Specifically, it will be shown that confu-
sion and conflict developed in the courts of New York in regard to
all these defense requests.
1. Police and Other Investigatory or Prosecutorial Reports
Prior to the enactment of article 240 in 1971, New York courts
consistently denied discovery motions for such items as investiga-
tive reports, memoranda or notes of police officers and prosecutors,
and other investigatory related material.' These holdings were
99. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
101. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 255.20 & commentary (McKinney Supp. 1979).
102. People v. Buchalter, 289 N.Y. 244, 45 N.E. 2d 425 (1942) (police records); People v.
Marshall, 5 A.D.2d 352, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (3d Dep't 1958) (worksheets and files); Mulry v.
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codified in the section of the original article 240 which defined ex-
empt property. 03 Shortly after the enactment of article 240, how-
ever, New York courts began to criticize and circumvent this re-
striction. In People v. Inness,1'0 for example, a court granted a
motion for discovery of accident investigation reports arising out of
a vehicular homicide.0 5 The court criticized the definition of ex-
empt property in section 240.10(3)(a) as a generalization and
granted the motion "in the interests of justice."'" The court ration-
alized its disregard for section 240.10(3)(a) by distinguishing be-
tween material constituting work product and material constituting
routine accident investigation reports relating to physical facts. 07
In People v. Wright,08 the defendant made a motion for discov-
ery of "any and all reports, papers and forms" of the police depart-
ment "concerning the investigation and arrest of the defendant,"
and then specifically named the various forms sought.'00 In granting
the motion, the court made a lengthy argument for the expansion
of criminal discovery."0 The court held that section 240.10(3)(a)'s
express exemption from discovery of "reports . . .made by . . .
police officers,""' did not include "the usual police arrest reports,
incident reports and the like . . '"I" The court distinguished this
material from "work papers that result from interviews and actual
trial preparation which are not discoverable.""' Discovery of the
requested material, the court concluded, would lead to an "earlier
disposition" of the case, perhaps through the defendant's pleading
guilty."'
This trend of allowing discovery of routine reports continued de-
spite the fact that section 240.10(3) did not distinguish between
Beckmann, 188 Misc. 648, 69 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (police records). In fact, it
seemed that virtually every document in the prosecution file was free from discovery by the
defense. See People v. Giles, 31 Misc. 2d 354, 220 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Erie County Ct. 1961).
103. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.10(3)(a). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
104. 69 Misc. 2d 429, 326 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Westchester County Ct. 1971).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 430-31, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72.
107. Id. at 431, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
108. 74 Misc. 2d 419, 343 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
109. Id. at 419, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
110. Id. at 421-24, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 946-49.
111. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
112. 74 Misc. 2d at 424, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
113. Id. at 424-25, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
114. Id.
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routine material and work product."' For example, in People v.
Rice,"' the defendant, indicted for murder, applied for an order
seeking discovery of all police reports and records, including photo-
graphs, made in connection with the investigation of his case." 7
The court granted the request and, citing the Wright and Inness
cases, determined that exempt property as defined in section
240.10(3)(a) "should not, and does not, encompass routine police
reports containing factual information.""' Such reports, the court
said, were distinguishable from "actual" work product of the police
or prosecution "consisting of legal opinions, theories, statements of
witnesses and other nonfactual information" which the court con-
sidered to be "nondiscoverable as exempt property.""'
In so holding, the court in Rice made a very strong argument in
support of more open criminal discovery in New York. The court
argued, first, that full disclosure prior to trial would help the judi-
cial process achieve its ultimate goal of arriving at the truth and,
second, that broad discovery would expedite the handling of cases
because it would encourage defendants to plea bargain.' 0 Discovery
would also avoid delay at trial when material was given to the de-
fense for impeachment purposes after a prosecution witness had
testified.'"' In this latter argument, the Rice court was actually rec-
ommending an acceleration of the timing of disclosure required in
New York under the rule of People v. Rosario. '22 The Rosario rule
requires disclosure to the defendant after a prosecution witness tes-
tifies at trial of any prior statements made by the witness. 23 Rosa-
rio also mandates "the production at trial of any police reports,
memoranda, etc. prepared by the testifying officer so that defense
counsel may utilize the same for impeachment purposes.' 1 4 In
115. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
116. 76 Misc. 2d 632, 351 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974).
117. Id. The court noted that these reports are required to be filed in the normal course
of business by police department regulations. Id. at 634, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 633-34, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
121. Id. at 633-34, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
122. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 886 (1961).
123. Id. at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Until Rosario, New York courts
had permitted the defendant to examine a witness' prior statement only if it contained mat-
ter inconsistent with the testimony the witness gave on the stand. Id.
124. 76 Misc. 2d at 633, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
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practice, the Rosario rule causes delay at trial because effective im-
peachment of the witness requires that defense counsel have time
to study the reports before cross-examination.' In order to avoid
delay and to allow defense counsel to prepare his cross-examina-
tion, the Rice court favored making such reports available to de-
fense counsel before trial. "'
In contrast to these cases, other courts refused to circumvent the
exempt property definition contained in section 240.10(3). For ex-
ample, in People v. Hvizd, 27 the defendant moved for discovery of
"all investigative reports, statements of witnesses and other docu-
ments prepared and gathered during the investigation.' 12 8 The mo-
tion was denied, without opinion, on the grounds that the re-
quested reports were exempt property under section 240.10(3).12
Similarly, in People v. Lawrence,"'3 the court denied a defendant's
discovery motion on the grounds that the requested material was
exempt.' The defendant in that case was charged with drunken
driving. He moved for discovery of the alcoholic influence report of
the arresting officer. 32 Although the court held that under section
240.20(1)(b)'3 the defendant was entitled to discover those portions
of the report which contained his answers to the officer's ques-
tions, 3 it also held that the defendant was not entitled to that part
125. Id. at 633-34, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
126. Id. at 634, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 891. The decisions in Inness, Wright and Rice were fol-
lowed in two subsequent cases, both of which reiterated the distinction between routine re-
ports and work product. In People v. Harrison, 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Just. Ct.
1975), the defendant moved for discovery of police reports. The prosecution claimed that
such reports were exempt under section 240.10(3)(a). Id. at 147, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 765. The
court held that the term exempt property did not include "routine police reports containing
information and which are required to be filed in the normal course of business by a police
agency's regulations." Id. In arriving at the same result, the court in People v. Simone, 92
Misc. 2d 306, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1977), not only distinguished work product from
routine reports, but also defined the term work product, which it admitted "eludes precise
definition," to include "interviews with witnesses, police prosecution memoranda relating to
the 'theory' of the crime, and other trial preparation materials consisting of more than mere
factual data." Id. at 312-13, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
127. 70 Misc. 2d 654, 334 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Westchester County Ct. 1972).
128. Id. at 655, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
129. Id. at 657, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
130. 74 Misc. 2d 1019, 346 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1973).
131. Id. at 1021, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
132. Id. at 1020, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
133. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
134. 74 Misc. 2d at 1021, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 333. The defendant was allowed discovery of
the reports on the results of physical tests which he performed at the request of the arresting
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of the report in which the officer's observations of the defendant
were recorded.'35 These portions were found to constitute exempt
property.'3
People v. Privitera'37 provides a further illustration of a court's
refusal to stray from the provisions of the original article 240. In
this case, the defendant moved for discovery of a wide range of po-
lice reports.'38 Unlike the previously discussed cases, the court in-
ferred that the standard for discovery of this material was section
240.20(3).' 39 This section required that the requested material not
be exempt.'40 The court denied the motion on the grounds that the
reports requested were exempt under section 240.10(3)(a).", The
court, seemingly criticizing the Wright and Rice decisions,'42
stated: "To read into this statute that police reports should be dis-
coverable is not consistent with the language [of section 240.10(3)]
no matter how salutary and otherwise worthwhile the motive for so
doing may seem. Our Legislature has considered what property
should be discoverable and their determination should not be
disturbed.' 4 3
Two appellate division cases are consistent with this approach.
In People v. Freeland,'44 the court held that police reports of a wit-
ness' identification were exempt property and, therefore, non-dis-
coverable by the defense.' 5 Similarly, in Morgenthau v. Hopes,'
4
the court held that complaint follow-up reports relating to a police
investigation were exempt property and, therefore, unavailable to
the defense.14
7




137. 80 Misc. 2d 344, 363 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Monroe County Ct. 1974).
138. Id. at 345, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
139. Id. at 346, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 229. See notes 60-62 & 98-100 supra and accompanying
text.
140. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(3).
141. 80 Misc. 2d at 347, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
142. See notes 108-26 supra and accompanying text.
143. 80 Misc. 2d at 346, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
144. 45 A.D.2d 814, 356 N.Y.S.2d 912 (4th Dep't 1974), reversed on other grounds, 36
N.Y.2d 518, 330 N.E.2d 611, 369 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1975).
145. Id. at 815.
146. 55 A.D.2d 255, 390 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1st Dep't 1977).
147. Id. at 257, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
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the issue of whether police reports were exempt property under the
original article 240. Some courts strictly adhered to the provisions
of the original article, while others circumvented the statute to
achieve the results they desired.
2. Names and Addresses of Prospective Prosecution Witnesses
The original article 240 exempted statements of prospective pros-
ecution witnesses from discovery," ' but did not expressly state
whether names and addresses of witnesses were discoverable. This
information was theoretically discoverable under section
240.20(3). 111 Most courts did not rely on this section, however, be-
cause a pre-CPL court of appeals case, People v. Lynch, 15 0 had held
that pretrial disclosure of the names of witnesses was a matter rest-
ing in the trial court's discretion.'
The first post-CPL case to rely on this discretionary power to
grant a motion for discovery of the names and addresses of all po-
tential prosecution witnesses was People v. Barnes. 52 Noting that
article 240 was silent on this issue, the court stated:
[Plermitting pretrial discovery of potential prosecution witnesses will en-
hance the possibility of satisfactory pretrial dispositions in that counsel will
be in a better position to investigate his case and advise his client with re-
gard to the possibilities of success at trial. In addition, pretrial disclosure of
the names of witnesses will enable counsel to better prepare for trial, avoid
undue surprises, adequately cross-examine witnesses, and avoid unnecessary
148. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.10(3)(b).
149. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. From 1881 to 1936 prosecutors in
New York were required under the old Code of Criminal Procedure to attach to the indict-
ment the names of prosecution witnesses who testified before the grand jury. 1881 N.Y. Laws
ch. 442, § 271 (McKinney). This section was repealed in 1936. 1936 N.Y. Laws ch. 22 (Mc-
Kinney). There seems to be some conflict as to why this law was repealed. At the time, therE
were various racketeering investigations underway and the repeal of this requirement would
ostensibly have protected prosecution witnesses from intimidation. It has also been pointed
out that the practice of annexing witnesses' names to the indictment had resulted in many
motions to dismiss the indictment, so that the repeal of the requirement was primarily to pro-
mote a more efficient administration of criminal jusrice. Compare Discovery in New York,
supra note 3, at 100 with ABA Report, supra note 5, at 711.
150. 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968).
151. Id. at 271-72, 244 N.E.2d at 35, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 334-35. In Lynch, the court of
appeals affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion for the names of witnesses, saying that "if,
indeed, such discovery may be had in the trial court's discretion, the refusal of discovery in
this case was not an abuse of that discretion." Id. at 272, 244 N.E.2d at 35, 296 N.Y.S.2d at
334-35.
152. 74 Misc. 2d 743, 344 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Suffolk County Ct. 1973).
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delays caused by inadequate preparation.' 3
In People v. Bennett,'54 the court used its discretionary power to
deny discovery of the names and addresses of prospective prosecu-
tion witnesses.'55 This case involved a prison uprising and many of
the government's witnesses were to be inmates.' The court held
that "the risks inherent in disclosing the identity of these witnesses
before trial far outweighed the advantage to be gained by the de-
fense in the preparation of their case."'' 7 Similarly, in People v.
Hvizd,5 15 the court implied that to grant discovery of the names
and addresses of prospective prosecution witnesses was beyond its
discretionary powers by holding that such material was not subject
to pretrial disclosure. 5 ' In what appears to be a contradictory
statement, however, the court also noted that the defendant had
153. Id. at 744, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 476. The court provided for reargument of its discovery
order if the prosecution felt that there were "compelling circumstances indicating that po-
tential witnesses may be tampered with or threatened." Id. at 745, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
When the district attorney in the Barnes case commenced a proceeding pursuant to article
78 of the CPLR to prohibit the trial court judge from entering his order, the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department, denied the application without opinion. Aspland v. Judges of
County Court of Suffolk County, 42 A.D.2d 930 (2d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied,
33 N.Y.2d 515 (1973). A number of cases have followed the Barnes reasoning. For ex-
ample, in People v. Robinson, 75 Misc. 2d 477, 347 N.YS.2d 860 (Mount Vernon City Ct.
1973), a city court judge granted a motion by the defendant for discovery of the names and
addresses of prospective prosecution witnesses in a trial for harassment of a police officer. On
reargument, 75 Misc. 2d 807, 349 N.Y.S.2d 259, the judge adhered to his original decision,
citing the Barnes case as support, though he limited it to its facts. Id. at 807-08, 349
N.Y.S.2d at 260-61. The district attorney brought an article 78 proceeding for a judgment in
the nature of a prohibition restraining the city court judge from proceeding with the order of
discovery. The Supreme Court of Westchester County cited Aspland, as "reluctantly"
inhibiting it from granting an order of prohibition as to the names and addresses of witnesses.
Vergari v. Kendall,' 76 Misc. 2d 848, 856, 352 N.Y.S.2d 383, 392 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1974), aff'd 46 A.D.2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (2d Dep't 1974). Discovery and
inspection of the names and addresses of witnesses was also granted in People v. Wayman,
82 Misc. 2d 959, 371 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Just. Ct. 1975). People v. Harrison, 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364
N.Y.S.2d 760 (Just. Ct. 1975).
154. 75 Misc. 2d 1040, 349 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
155. Id. at 1057, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
156. Id. at 1044, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
157. Id. at 1057, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25. The court continued: "In any event, under the
practice that presently prevails in this court, the names of prospective witnesses will be
revealed at the time of jury selection upon opening of the trials." Id. (emphasis added).
Apparently, no other court has explicitly stated that it adheres to such a policy. This prac-
tice, however, closely foreshadows the approach taken by the newly enacted article 240. See
notes 300, 313-15 infra and accompanying text.
158. 70 Misc. 2d 654, 334 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Westchester County Ct. 1972).
159. Id. at 657, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
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failed to establish the materiality and reasonableness of his re-
quest.10 This seems to be a reference to the requirements of section
240.20(3), which gives courts the discretion to grant motions for
"other property."'"' In People v. Spencer,'2 however, the court left
no room for contradiction when it held that names of witnesses
were not discoverable prior to trial and stated that criminal discov-
ery "is limited to those items listed in CPL 240.20."63
In one case, People v. Howard,' the defense, after receiving the
names and addresses of prosecution witnesses, requested the "rap
sheets" of any witness whom the prosecutor intended to call at
trial.' 5 Although there was no provision in the original article 240
for discovery of the prior criminal record of prosecution witnesses,
the court used its discretionary powers to grant the motion on the
grounds that the "rap sheets" were critical to the defendant's effec-
tive cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses.'66 Thus, the re-
quest satisfied the requirements of materiality and reasonableness
of section 240.20(3).117
These cases show that the lower courts in New York were divided
on the question of whether the names and addresses of prospective
prosecution witnesses were subject to pretrial disclosure.
3. Grand Jury Testimony and Statements of Prospective Prose-
cution Witnesses
Prior to the enactment of the CPL in 1971, New York courts con-
sistently held that defendants could not obtain discovery of the
grand jury testimony or statements of prospective prosecution wit-
nesses.'6 8 Although the original article 240 directed that a defen-
dant be furnished with the record of his testimony before the grand
160. Id.
161. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
162. 79 Misc. 2d 72, 361 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
163. Id. at 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
164. 89 Misc. 2d 911, 392 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Onondaga County Ct. 1977).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 912, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968);
People v. Johnston, 55 Misc. 2d 185, 285 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Tioga County Ct. 1967); People v.
Graziano, 46 Misc. 2d 936, 261 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Columbia County Ct. 1965); People v. Giles,
31 Misc. 2d 354, 220 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Erie County Ct. 1961). But see People v. Catto, 28
A.D.2d 1116, 285 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1st Dep't 1967); People v. Powell, 49 Misc. 2d 624, 268
N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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jury,' it did not contain a provision for defense access to the grand
jury testimony of prospective prosecution witnesses. Other state-
ments made by potential prosecution witnesses, however, were spe-
cifically designated as exempt property in section 240.10(3)(b) and
hence were non-discoverable.10
Shortly after the original article 240 was enacted, one commenta-
tor, noting a trend toward relaxing the grand jury secrecy require-
ments, argued that the standards for a defense motion for discovery
of a prosecution witness' grand jury testimony might be found in
CPL section 240.20(3).'" This approach, however, was precluded in
1972 by the case of Proskin v. County Court of Albany County.' In
that case, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion to
inspect the grand jury minutes on the grounds that it was neces-
sary for the preparation of defendant's case and was in the inter-
ests of justice.' The court of appeals granted a writ of prohibition
and held that the trial court had exceeded its authority in allowing
the defendant to inspect the grand jury minutes for purposes of
discovery.' The court stated:
The cloak of secrecy accorded Grand Jury proceedings for the protection of
the public, witnesses, potential defendants, and others may not be lifted for
purposes of general unilateral discovery before a criminal trial . . . . The
nub of the matter is that the inspection of Grand Jury minutes in advance
of trial is available only to attack the indictment, and may not be allowed
only to assist the litigant in the trial which may ensue.'
The holding in Proskin was not affected by the fact that portions
of such testimony would probably be given to the defense at trial
pursuant to the rules of People v. Rosario' and Brady v. Mary-
land.'77 As earlier explained,' Rosario gave the defense the right to
examine all prior statements of a prosecution witness but only after
that witness had testified at trial. It seems highly unlikely, how-
169. CPL, supra note 33, sec. 1, § 240.20(1)(a). See text accompanying note 52 supra.
170. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
171. See Discovery in New York, supra note 3, at 102.
172. 30 N.Y.2d 15, 280 N.E.2d 875, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972).
173. Id. at 17, 280 N.E.2d at 876, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
174. Id. at 19, 280 N.E.2d at 879, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
175. Id. at 17-19, 280 N.E.2d at 876-79, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 46-48.
176. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 886 (1961).
177. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution has duty to disclose all favorable evidence). See
notes 195-200 infra and accompanying text.
178. See note 122-23 supra and accompanying text.
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ever, that a defense attorney could effectively cross-examine a wit-
ness when he receives such vital impeachment information at this
late stage in the trial.'79 In order to avoid this dilemma, defense
attorneys often moved before trial for discovery of a potential pros-
ecution witness' grand jury testimony and other prior statements.
Despite the Proskin holding and the fact that statements of poten-
tial prosecution witnesses were specifically defined as exempt, de-
fendants were sometimes granted such discovery.
In People v. Nicolini, "I for example, the defendants, prior to the
commencement of the voir dire, moved for an order directing the
prosecution to furnish defense counsel with the transcripts of the
grand jury testimony and the prior statements of prospective prose-
cution witnesses. 8' In support of their motion, the defendants cited
People v. Rosario."2 The district attorney opposed the motion on
the grounds that the Rosario rule required disclosure only after the
witness had testified at trial.8 3 The court defined the issue as
whether the Rosario rule was "to be construed as authorizing the
turning over to the defense of the Grand Jury testimony and any
other prior statements only after the prosecution witness has testi-
fied for the People."' 84 The court decided that the Rosario rule
should not be so restricted; rather, the court interpreted the rule to
require only that the grand jury testimony and prior statements of
witnesses be furnished to the defendant "at the trial. "I"8 Although
the court stated that it was "not required" to order that the tran-
scripts be furnished to defense counsel before the witness has testi-
fied, it granted the motion, adding that "it is within the Trial
Judge's discretion to make the prior statements available, prior to
such direct testimony, if the interests of the orderly conduct of the
trial suggests [the] same."'"8
The Nicolini court was in fact recommending an acceleration of
the timing of disclosure under the Rosario rule on the grounds that
179. In addition, should the court recess in order for the defense attorney to quickly ex-
amine this material, the trial would be disrupted and the case disposed of inefficiently.
180. 76 Misc. 2d 47, 349 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
181. Id. at 48, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 49, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
185. Id., quoting People ex rel. Cadogan v. McMann, 24 N.Y.2d 233, 236, 247 N.E.2d
492, 493, 299 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1969).
186. 76 Misc. 2d at 49-50, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74.
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this would make the disposition of cases more efficient by avoiding
delay at trial. This is the same reasoning utilized by the court in
People v. Rice in granting a motion for pretrial discovery of police
reports to be used for impeachment purposes.'87 In the Rice case,
subsequent to the request for discovery of the police reports, the
defendants made an omnibus motion for discovery of all state-
ments of potential prosecution witnesses, including testimony
before the grand jury.'" The court granted the motion, explaining
that because such prior statements were required by Rosario to be
"disclosed sometime during the trial, it would perhaps be the bet-
ter practice to allow discovery immediately prior to trial in the in-
terest of enabling counsel to better prepare his cross-examination
and avoiding unnecessary delays and disjointed trials."'89
Although the courts in Nicolini and Rice ignored the fact that
statements of witnesses were exempt property under section
240.10(3)(b),190 other courts were more reluctant to stray from the
strictures of article 240. In People v. Bennett,"' for example, a case
which preceded Nicolini and Rice, the court set out the text of sec-
tion 240.10(3)(b) and said that statements of prospective prosecu-
tion witnesses were obviously exempt property so that, "apart from
any obligation upon the prosecutor arising out of the principles
enunciated in Brady v. Maryland. . .the clear and unambiguous
language of the statute excludes pretrial discovery of this mate-
rial.""'2 Additionally, other courts denied defense discovery of wit-
nesses' statements not because they were exempt property, but
rather, because of a refusal to extend the Rosario rule to pretrial
stages. As the court stated in People v. Spencer, "' "[t]he right to
187. See notes 115-26 supra and accompanying text.
188. People v. Rice, 77 Misc. 2d 582, 353 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974).
189. Id. at 584, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
190. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
191. 75 Misc. 2d 1040, 349 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
192. Id. at 1054, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The Bennett court also discussed the Inness and
Wright cases wherein the question was raised whether police reports were exempt property
under section 240.10(3)(a). See notes 104-14 supra and accompanying text. The court noted
that although the Wright court had granted discovery of the police reports, it had denied
"discovery of materials which reflected the results of interviews with prospective witnesses."
75 Misc. 2d at 1054, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 1042. The court also said that although the Inness and
Wright cases had interpreted section 240.10(3)(a) liberally in allowing discovery of police
reports, neither case supported the discovery of the statements of witnesses whom the prose-
cution intended to call at trial. Id.
193. 79 Misc. 2d 72, 361 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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obtain a prior statement of a witness accrues only after that wit-
ness has testified at trial." ' 4
These cases illustrate that the lower courts in New York were in
conflict as to whether witnesses' statements could be discovered by
the defense prior to trial despite the express provision in the origi-
nal article 240 which made such material exempt.
4. Exculpatory Evidence
In Brady v. Maryland,"' the Supreme Cburt established the
prosecutorial duty to divulge favorable evidence to the defense. In
Brady, the defendant, charged with murder, moved for discovery of
all statements of his co-defendant."6 The prosecutor showed him
several of the co-defendant's statements but not the one in which
the co-defendant admitted that he, and not the defendant, had ac-
tually killed the victim."' The defendant was convicted and the
death penalty was imposed."' Upon learning of the co-defendant's
admission, the defendant moved for a new trial alleging suppres-
sion of evidence."' The Supreme Court held that "the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violate[d] due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution." '
The Brady case, and many of the subsequent cases in which the
194. Id. at 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 241. See also People v. Landers, 97 Misc. 2d 274, 276, 411
N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1978). But see People v. Mono, 96 Misc. 2d 382,
409 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Jefferson County Ct. 1978); People v. Dash, 95 Misc. 2d 1005, 1008, 409
N.Y.S.2d 181, 184 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
195. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).




200. Id. at 87. The defendant was awarded a new trial only on the issue of punishment,
not on the issue of guilt. The co-defendant's idmission to committing the murder did not
mitigate the defendant's own guilt. Id. at 90. Brady seems to make a defense motion a
mandatory requirement for discovery of favorable evidence by using the words "upon re-
quest." However, many cases pre-dating Brady, as well as more recent cases, have not re-
quired that the defense make a specific request or demand for Brady material. See United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959); People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 325 N.E.2d 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1975); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 159 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956); People
v. Boone, 49 A.D.2d 559, 370 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1st Dep't 1975); People v. Player, 80 Misc.2d
177, 362 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974).
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Brady rule has been applied, involved post-trial motions for review
of the prosecution's conduct as to alleged suppression of favorable
evidence.10' Many courts have therefore held that Brady "was never
intended to create pretrial remedies.""2 ' One New York court of-
fered two possible rationales for such holdings. 03 The first was that
the Brady rule forbids suppression of favorable evidence, which is
"a standard of performance reviewable only against the back-
ground of a trial, and therefore did not create an affirmative obliga-
tion to turn over favorable material at any stage prior to the
trial." 10' The second was that favorable evidence is "not a class of
information available to the defense under rules of pretrial discov-
ery and is therefore unobtainable prior to trial.""'' More recently
some courts have recommended early disclosure of Brady material
on the grounds that disclosure of exculpatory or favorable evidence
for the first time during trial may be too late for the defendant to
use it effectively.101
The question presented to New York courts, therefore, was
whether the scope of defendants' pretrial discovery rights was
broadened by the Brady doctrine."7 The original article 240 pro-
201. E.g., United States v. White, 450 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1971); see also cases cited in
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73 (1967).
202. United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107, 1108 (6th Cir. 1971). See United States ex
rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 939 (1975);
United States v. Zive, 299 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); People v. McMahon, 72
Misc. 2d 1097, 1099, 341 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (Albany County Ct. 1972).
203. People v. Bottom, 76 Misc. 2d 525, 351 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
204. Id. at 527, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33.
205. Id. at 527, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
206. United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Pollack, 534
F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Deutsch, 373 F.
Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
207. The section will focus only tangentially on what constitutes "Brady material" and
what the sanctions are for the failure of the prosecution to disclose such material. In United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Brady by
delineating three situations in which the rule applied, each involving the discovery, after
trial, of information which had been known to the prosecutor but unknown to the defense.
Id. at 103-07. In the first situation, the undisclosed evidence proves that the prosecution's
case included perjured testimony about which the prosecution knew or should have known.
In such circumstances, "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury," the conviction must be set aside. Id. at 103. The
next two situations are distinguished by whether there is a pretrial request for the specific
favorable evidence in issue. Where a pretrial request for specific evidence is made and that
evidence is suppressed by the prosecution, a conviction must be set -aside if the evidence
"might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. Where there is no specific request,
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vided no guidance on this issue because it made no reference to
discovery of exculpatory or favorable evidence. The first New York
case to decide a request for pretrial disclosure of alleged Brady ma-
terial was People v. McMahon."°' The defendants made a broad
discovery motion under section 240.20.0 The court held that
"[p]ermissible discovery should be that which the statute now per-
mits, the unpermissible is that which is not authorized by the rule
or forbidden by it."10 Because exculpatory or favorable evidence
was not mentioned as discoverable in the original article 240, the
court, interpreting the statute narrowly, denied the motion for dis-
covery of exculpatory evidence simply on the grounds that it was
not available under the statute."' The McMahon court also said
that a practicable rule of discovery of Brady material was impossi-
ble to construct and, therefore, the defendant and the courts had to
rely on the conscience of the prosecutor in performance of his duty
not to suppress favorable evidence.2"
In People v. Bottom,"' however, the circumstances forced the
court to intervene and analyze the significance of the Brady rule at
the pretrial stage."t4 The defense had made the customary request
for favorable evidence pursuant to the Brady rule; the district at-
torney's office made the customary reply that it was aware of and
would comply with its obligation under Brady."' The court had
also given the prosecution the routine direction to disclose all
Brady material .21 At that point, however, the prosecution submit-
ted the following affidavit: " 'Two people, one of whom has re-
canted, and the other of whom has disappeared, once claimed they
the prosecution is deemed to have been without notice of what evidence the defense would
like and although the duty to disclose arises, the evidence which must be disclosed is that
which would have created a reasonable doubt. The conviction must be set aside if such
evidence is not disclosed. Id. at 107-14.
208. 72 Misc. 2d 1097, 341 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Albany County Ct. 1972).
209. Id. at 1098, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
210. Id. at 1099, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
211. Id. at 1099-100, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21. In a later case, the court granted a motion
for discovery of all evidence favorable to the defendant. People v. Wright, 74 Misc. 2d 419,
424, 343 N.Y.S.2d 944, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
212. 72 Misc. 2d at 1099-100, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21.
213. 76 Misc. 2d 525, 351 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
214. Id. at 525-27, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 331-33.
215. Id. at 525, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
216. Id. Such a scenario explains the fact that many cases under Brady are decided in a
post trial context.
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saw another man not one of these defendants near the scene of the
killings with a pistol. This other man could not have been one of
the killers.' "2I7 The prosecution complied with the defendant's mo-
tion for the names of these two men.2"8 Thereafter, the defendants
made a motion for " '[aill statements or police forms or reports
which reflect the statements or investigation of the statements' " of
the two men referred to in the affidavit.2" The prosecution opposed
this motion'on the grounds that it had fully complied with its du-
ties under Brady and that the material requested by the defendant
was exempt property.20
By the very act of intervening to decide the defendant's motion,
the Bottom court rejected the premise of the McMahon decision
that a rule for discovery of Brady material Was impracticable and
that reliance had to be placed on the prosecutor.12 Seemingly in
response to that position, the court in Bottom held:
For pragmatic reasons the court cannot become involved in screening the
prosecution's file in every case . . . . The result is that the prosecutor must
of necessity have a great deal of initial discretion over what is to be dis-
closed . . . . But where, as here, there is a controversy in which the court
has a factual basis for believing that the District Attorney may be in posses-
sion of exculpatory evidence, total reliance on the prosecutor is no longer
necessary and may be unjustified. The trial court's supervision should then
begin.In
Answering the prosecution's contention that the requested material
was exempt property under section 240.10, the court in Bottom
stated:
It is fallacious to deny pretrial disclosure of Brady material on the theory
that it is not a category of permissible discovery. The fallacy is equating the
Brady concept with pretrial discovery. Discovery concerns the pretrial dis-
closure of prosecution evidence. The procedure is statutory and largely dis-
cretionary. (CPL 240.20.) Brady, on the other hand, is a constitutional man-
date which requires the disclosure of defense evidence in the possession of
the prosecution.223
217. Id. at 525-26, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
218. Id. at 526, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
222. 76 Misc. 2d at 530, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 531, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court ordered the district attorney to produce
for in camera inspection all the requested material. Id.
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The holding in Bottom24 was adopted by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Andre.'2 In Andre, the court of appeals held
that where a request is made and there is "some basis" for believ-
ing that the prosecution is in possession of exculpatory material,
the court and not the prosecutor must decide whether the material
should be disclosed. 2 16 In addition, many of New York's lower
courts have followed the Bottom decision and have held that when
evidence qualifies as Brady material this overrides concepts such as
exempt property and mandates disclosure of evidence which would
otherwise not be statutorily discoverable.2 7 Thus, New York courts
unanimously concluded that the Brady rule superseded the statu-
tory limitations on pretrial criminal discovery set forth in the origi-
nal article 240.
C. Reciprocal Discovery
Under section 240.20(4) of the original article 240, a court in its
discretion and upon granting a defense motion for discovery under
either section 240.20(2) or (3) could condition the order by di-
recting reciprocal discovery by the prosecution of the same kind of
property.22 8 Although reciprocal discovery was a potentially helpful
prosecutorial device, prosecutors were very skeptical of its useful-
ness in view of what has been termed "[a] major roadblock to the
prosecutor's right of discovery" - the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. 2 1
Despite the apparent problems posed by the fifth amendment, 3
224. See text accompanying note 222 supra.
225. 44 N.Y.2d 179, 375 N.E.2d 758, 404 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1978). See also People v. Testa,
40 N.Y.2d 1018, 359 N.E.2d 1367, 391 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976); People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d
446, 453-54, 354 N.E.2d 801, 804-05, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65-66 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
914 (1977).
226. 44 N.Y.2d at 184-85, 375 N.E.2d at 761, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
227. People v. Alamo, 89 Misc. 2d 246, 391 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (witness testi-
mony contained in grand jury minutes); People v. Harrison, 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d
760 (Just. Ct. 1975) (witnesses' statements, notes or memoranda of police officers of wit-
nesses' statements, photographs of defendant and names and addresses of persons inter-
viewed by prosecutor); People v. Guzman, 79 Misc. 2d 668, 361 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(statements of witnesses made to prosecution).
228. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
229. Discovery Procedures, supra note 29, at 177. The fifth amendment provides that
"[nlo person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
230. The Supreme Court has traditionally been very strict in applying the protection of
the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v.
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New York courts have indicated that requiring reciprocal discovery
prior to trial of material which the defendant intends to produce at
trial in his own behalf2 3' does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. 22 In addition, the Supreme Court has accepted dis-
covery by the prosecution as not inimical to the fifth amendment.
In Williams v. Florida,2  the Court held that a state statute that
required pretrial disclosure by the defense of the names of alibi
witnesses was not in violation of the defendant's fifth amendment
privilege." ' The Court reasoned that the statute required only that
the defendant "accelerate the timing of his disclosure" of the iden-
tity of the alibi witnesses. 235 In that same case, however, the Court
left open the question of whether the constitutionality of alibi-no-
tice statutes depended on the defendant enjoying reciprocal discov-
ery against the state.23 This question was resolved in the affirma-
tive by the Court in Wardius v. Oregon,237 wherein a state alibi-
notice statute was struck down because it did not afford the defen-
dant any right of reciprocal discovery.2 38
Aside from the fifth amendment objections, New York courts
have found other problems under the original article 240 which
have impeded the use of reciprocal discovery by the prosecution.
One of these problems was whether the prosecution's reciprocal dis-
covery motion had to be made at the same time the defendant's
motion for discovery was made or whether the prosecution could
wait to request reciprocal discovery at a later time. In People v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-33
(1886).
231. This was a requirement of the reciprocal discovery provision of the original article
240. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
232. See People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830, (1969);
People v. Lacey, 83 Misc. 2d 69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975). Cf. People v.
Green, 83 Misc. 2d 583, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). See also Lee v.
County Ct. of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1971) (where
defendant intends to raise the defense of insanity, he waives the privilege against self in-
crimination with respect to court-ordered psychiatric examinations); People v. Gliewe, 76
Misc. 2d 696, 351 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Monroe County Ct. 1974).
233. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
234. Id. at 86.
235. Id. at 85.
236. Id. at 82 n.11.
237. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
238. Id. at 478-79.
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Rexhouse, "I the court granted two separate defense motions for dis-
covery of prosecution evidence, one for the autopsy report per-
formed on the victim and the other for all other scientific reports.240
Subsequently, the prosecution made a motion for reciprocal discov-
ery of evidence of the same kind.Y This motion was denied by the
court on the grounds that the prosecution had not shown that the
requested items were material to the preparation of their case or
that the request was reasonable."' Notably, the court added that
the prosecution's motion was untimely because the two prior orders
of discovery had been granted without condition.21 3 Therefore,
under Rexhouse, the prosecution was required to make its motion
for reciprocal discovery at the same time as the defense made its
discovery requests so that a granting of the defense requests would
be conditional upon reciprocal discovery by the prosecution.
The opposite result was reached in People v. Green,2" wherein
after a defense discovery motion was unconditionally granted the
court, without discussion of the timeliness issue, granted a subse-
quent motion for reciprocal discovery by the prosecution.25 In the
latest case on this issue, however, the court in People v. Cattill,
denied as untimely the prosecution's motion for reciprocal discov-
ery which was made four days after the defendant's motion was
ruled upon. 47 In interpreting section 240.20(4),4 8 the court said
that "[a] motion for discovery by the People can only be made in
response to defendant's motion for discovery" and must be made
"during the pendency of the defense motion . ... "49 That the re-
ciprocal discovery provision of the original article 240 was inter-
preted in this way was an obvious deficiency in the statute since it
239. 77 Misc. 2d 386, 353 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Dutchess County Ct. 1974).
240. Id. at 386-87, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
241. Id. at 386, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
242. Id. at 388, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
243. Id. at 387, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
244. 83 Misc. 2d 583, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
245. Id. at 598, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 286. In Green, the court had first granted discovery of
both the statements, names, and addresses of the prosecution's witnesses. When the prose-
cution made its motion for reciprocal discovery for evidence of the same kind, the court
modified its original discovery order, excluding from it statements of prosecution witnesses.
Id.
246. 90 Misc. 2d 409, 394 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
247. Id. at 413, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
248. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
249. 90 Misc. 2d at 411, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
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inhibited the use of reciprocal discovery by the. prosecution.
A second issue which arose under the original article 240 was
whether the prosecution could obtain evidence from the defense de-
spite the defense having made no prior motion for that type of evi-
dence. In People v. Traver,25 the defendant notified the district at-
torney that he intended to rely upon the defense of insanity."5 ' In
response, the district attorney made a motion for an order requiring
a psychiatric examination of the defendant and for discovery of re-
ports concerning all previous physical and mental examinations of
the defendant.52 Although the court granted the motion for a psy-
chiatric examination, it denied the motion for discovery of prior
examinations on the grounds that section 240.20(4) allowed
prosecutorial discovery only as a condition to a pending defense
discovery motion.253
A later case, People v. Blacknall,154 came to a different conclu-
sion. In that case, involving facts similar to those in Traver, the
court pointed out that under Lee v. County Court of Erie County55
district attorneys were required to furnish defendants with copies
of reports of psychiatric examinations conducted by the prosecu-
tion's psychiatrist."'8 As a result, defendants obtained such reports
without making a discovery motion. 57 Under the Traver approach,
therefore, the prosecution could not discover the defendant's psy-
chiatrist's report because no defense motion need be made."' The
court in Blacknall commented on this dilemma by stating that
"[ilt would seem that such technical procedural refinements should
not be controlling in determining the issue of pretrial disclosure."259
In order "[t]o resolve the ambiguity and confusion in the present
state of the law," the Blacknall court granted the prosecution's mo-
tion, explaining that the requirement that the prosecution furnish
the defendant with a copy of its psychiatric report was equivalent
250. 70 Misc. 2d 162, 332 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Dutchess County Ct. 1972).
251. Id. at 163, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 164, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 957-58.
254. 82 Misc. 2d 646, 371 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Rockland County Ct. 1975).
255. 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1971).
256. 82 Misc. 2d at 647-48, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 306-08.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 648, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
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to a pending defense discovery motion."' The Blacknall court thus
concluded that the prosecution was entitled to reciprocal discovery
of the defendant's psychiatrist's report under section 240.20(4).21,
In conclusion, although reciprocal discovery seemed to be a
promising prosecutorial discovery tool, it failed to fulfill that prom-
ise due to impediments arising out of the original article 240 and a
refusal by many New York courts to be as liberal in granting dis-
covery to the prosecution as they were in granting discovery to the
defense.
IV. The Newly Enacted Article 240
The original article 240 did not always achieve its goals of liber-
ality and consistency in the practice of criminal discovery in New
York.21 2 As one court stated:
Some courts grant disclosure of almost any item by the defendant, others
have so strictly construed Article 240 as to disallow discovery for all material
other than that expressly enumerated under subdivisions 1 and 2 of CPL
240.20, and still other courts have adopted an eclectic approach, depending
on the circumstances of the case and the personal philosophy of the particu-
lar Trial Judge involved. Consequently, the result has frequently been an
utter lack of consistency in the practice relating to pretrial disclosure. 2
The original .article needed to be revised or replaced. Since its
enactment in 1971, various national study groups had recom-
mended a more liberal approach to discovery in criminal cases and
had issued model standards for implementing such an approach.64
260. Id. at 649, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 307-08.
261. Id.
262. See notes 33, 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
263. People v. Green, 83 Misc. 2d 583, 586, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275-76 (Crim. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975) (footnote omitted).
264. The most widely recognized study of pretrial discovery is ABA STANDARDS RELATING
To DISCOVERv AND PROCEDuRE BEFORE TRIAL (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1970). The ABA Standards, as put forth by a
group comprised of judges, academics, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, recommend that
the prosecution take the initiative in disclosing to the defendant the names and addresses of
witnesses whom the prosecution plans to call at a hearing or trial, along with their written or
recorded statements; statements of the defendant or co-defendant; those portions of the
grand jury minutes containing the testimony of the defendant and of witnesses to be called
at a hearing or trial; prior criminal convictions of prosecution witnesses; and real evidence.
ABA STANDARDS, supra, § 2.1. Some reciprocal discovery is provided for the prosecution, but
this does not include discovery of defense witnesses or their statements. Id. § 3.1-2.
Another oft-cited study in this area is the LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTmATION'S
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS (1973) [hereinaf-
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Criminal discovery had become the subject of a "nationwide re-
evaluation" ' 5 and several states had enacted statutes opening up
discovery in criminal cases."' In New York, however, several legis-
lative attempts to revise or replace the original article 240 failed,
indicating a wide gap separating those who favored opening up
criminal discovery in New York and those who did not. 67 Finally,
however, in 1979 the state legislature repealed the original article
240 and replaced it with a new discovery article, also entitled arti-
cle 240, which became effective January 1, 1980.65
ter cited as NAC STANDARDS]. The NAC Standards provide for disclosure by the prosecution
-to the defense of names and addresses of witnesses and the written, recorded, or oral state-
ments of witnesses, the defendant, or any co-defendant. Id. § 4.9. Unlike the ABA Stan-
dards, the NAC Standards provide for broad reciprocal discovery including the disclosure of
names, addresses, and statements of defense witnesses. Id. § 4.9 & commentary at 91. (See
People v. Green, 83 Misc. 2d 583, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1975) for an extensive discussion and
comparison of these two studies and the original article 240.).
A study made by the association of the Bar of the City of New York's Committee on
Criminal Courts unanimously recommended that the original article 240 be amended to re-
quire pretrial disclosure to the accused of the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses,
statements made by these witnesses to law enforcement agents, and their grand jury testi-
mony. In addition, a majority of the committee, over "substantial minority opposition," rec-
ommended that the New York Criminal Procedure Law article 240 be amended to provide
for reciprocal discovery by the prosecution of the names, addresses, and statements of wit-
nesses whom the defendant intends to call at trial. ABA Report, supra note 5.
265. 83 Misc. 2d at 585, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
266. McKenna, supra note 5, at 1868. See, e.g. ARIZ. R. CRIM. PROC. 15; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A §§ 411-415 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1979); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.14 (Vernon 1979).
267. In 1974 the Judicial Conference proposed an entirely new discovery article along
with a memorandum written in support thereof. See 1974 N.Y. Laws 1860-76 (McKinney).
The proposed bill provided for discovery by the defendant of oral statements, testimony of
grand jury witnesses, wiretap conversations and transcripts intended to be introduced as pro-
secution evidence, reports containing the notes of oral statements of witnesses, oral deposi-
tions or written interrogatories of witnesses, prior criminal records of the prosecution wit-
nesses, and any official records pertaining to the investigation leading to the defendant's in-
dictment which were not exempt property the definition of which no longer included state-
ments of witnesses made to authorities. The disclosure of any official records pertaining to
the investigation which led to the indictment was provided, according to the memorandum,
to "put teeth into the Brady ...requirement that evidence favorable to the defendant
be turned over to him." In addition, the proposed bill would have authorized discovery by
the defendant by demand rather than motion. As to this provision, the memorandum stated
that its purpose was "to divert as much discovery traffic as possible from the courts and place
the burden on the prosecutor to invoke the court's protection if he wishes to resist the dis-
covery." Id. From a prosecutorial standpoint, the proposed bill was probably viewed as an
onerous attempt to institute total open file discovery. The proposed 1974 legislation never be-
came law.
268. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 412 (McKinney).
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Under the new article 240, discovery may be obtained pursuant
to basically three different procedural mechanisms. First, certain
material may be discovered upon demand by both the defense and
the prosecution. 69 Second, certain material may be discovered
upon motion by either the defense or prosecution. 7 ' Third, certain
material may be discovered by the defendant upon trial and by the
prosecutor during trial.2"'
The first important innovation to be noted in the new article 240
is that it provides for discovery of certain items by demand rather
than by motion. 2 The memorandum accompanying the new law
explained:
The basic approach of the measure is to enlarge discovery, under its own
name, and to permit both sides to obtain discovery of routine material upon
demand, that is, without a court order. Much of the material that is now
wrung from the other side through complex pretrial motion practice or at
trial, with the attendant delays, would be discoverable upon demand, sub-
ject in later section to refusals or protective orders where the safety of wit-
nesses, the confidentiality of informants, or other factors require them.Y'
Discovery on demand, as the memorandum points out, is an at-
tempt to make the disposition of criminal cases more efficient. 7 ' To
achieve this goal the new article 240 allows a defendant to discover
upon demand all of the material discoverable under the original
article's section 240.20(1) and (2)rl as well as oral statements made
by him and written, recorded or oral statements, including grand
jury testimony, of a co-defendant to be tried jointly.7 This provi-
sion is designed to allow a defendant to "intelligently challenge, or
269. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.20, .30 (McKinney Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as CPL Supp.].
270. Id. § 240.40.
271. Id. § 240.45.
272. Id. §§ 240.20, .30 " 'Demand to produce' means a written notice served by and on a
party to a criminal action, without leave of the Court, demanding to inspect properly pursu-
ant to this article and giving reasonable notice of the time at which the demanding party
wishes to inspect the property designated." Id. § 240.10(1). (emphasis added).
273. 1979 N.Y. Laws 1888-89 (McKinney).
274. It should be noted that for discovery by demand to be effective in achieving this
goal of efficiency, both prosecutors and defense attorneys must cooperate with each other in
deciding upon a time at which the demanding party may inspect the property. For timeta-
bles for demands and refusals see CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.80.
275. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
276. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.20(1)(a)-(b).
1979-801
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
prepare for, a joint trial." '77 A defendant is also entitled to discov-
ery on demand of prosecution photographs or drawings relating to
the crime, any other property obtained from him or a co-defendant,
and tapes or other electronic recordings which the prosecutor in-
tends to introduce at trial.28
The new article also provides for defense discovery on demand of
"[alnything required to be disclosed, prior to trial, to the defendant
by the prosecutor, pursuant to the constitution of this state or of
the United States. 27' This is actually a codification of the rule of
Brady v. Maryland,2' under which the prosecutor has a constitu-
tional duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant. 8 ' By
specifically including this duty in the new law, decisions like Peo-
ple v. McMahon, where a motion for exculpatory evidence was de-
nied because discovery of such material was not provided for in the
original article 240, will be eliminated.52 Furthermore, those courts
which held that the Brady doctrine took precedence over such con-
cepts as exempt property now have statutory support.2 13
Under the new article the prosecution is entitled to discovery
upon demand of reports of psychiatric examinations of a defendant
by his own psychiatrist. 28' This innovation is an attempt to pro-
mote mutuality of discovery. Indeed, discovery of this material on
demand alleviates the problem exemplified by the Traver and
Blacknall cases when prosecutors request discovery of reports of
277. 1979 N.Y. Laws 1889 (McKinney).
278. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.20(1)(d)-(f). Discovery of all of this material was
previously discretionary with the court. 1979 N.Y. Laws 1889 (McKinney). In regard to dis-
covery by the defense of the defendant's tape recorded conversations, the requirement that the
prosecutor intend to introduce the recordings at trial invites problems. Often a prosecutor
will not know whether he will introduce such evidence untifor during trial. If for some reason
he believes prior to trial that he will not introduce tape recordings and then a trial changes
his mind, defendants would have a strong argument that they should have been allowed pre-
trial inspection of the recordings. It is uncertain how courts will determine whether the
prosecutor genuinely did not know if he would introduce such recordings or purposely claimed
that he did not intend to introduce them so that the recordings could not be discovered prior
to trial.
279. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.20(1)(g).
280. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
281. 1979 N.Y. Laws 1889 (McKinney).
282. See notes 208-12 supra and accompanying text.
283. See notes 213-27 supra and accompanying text.
284. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.30(1). On the fifth amendment issue, the support-
ing memorandum states that the section "affects only timing, and consequently the defen-




psychiatric examinations prepared by a defendant's psychiatrist."'
Under the new law no defense motion is needed for the prosecutor
to obtain such reports."'6 In addition, discovery of such reports by
the prosecutor on demand effectively eliminates the issue concern-
ing the timeliness of the prosecution's motion for reciprocal discov-
ery.2"7 It should be noted, however, that under the section which
provides for discovery by motion,288 the potential still exists for the
timeliness issue to arise. This is because in affording the prosecu-
tion reciprocal discovery "[u]pon granting" the defendant's motion,
the new law, as did the original article 240, fails to make clear
whether the prosecutor must make a counter motion concurrently
with the defendant's motion.289
A problem may arise under the section that authorizes
prosecutorial discovery on demand because the prosecutor is only
entitled to "written" reports concerning examinations or tests con-
ducted at the defendant's request.9 0 This invites defense attorneys,
though they may not admit it, to have the same tests conducted
but to have the results conveyed to them orally so there would be
no written report to be discovered. If this becomes the practice of
defense attorneys, it will severely lessen the effectiveness of
prosecutorial discovery on demand.2' This procedural deficiency in
the statute, which invites avoidance of the section's intended re-
sult, should not control the practice of criminal discovery. It could
be eliminated simply by requiring that all reports concerning ex-
aminations or tests be put into writing.
A second important change instituted by the new article 240 is
that the former definition of exempt property has been eliminated
and is replaced by "attorney's work product."282 This term is much
more narrowly defined than was exempt property under the old ar-
ticle; it includes only "the opinions, theories or conclusions of the
285. See text accompanying notes 250-61 supra.
286. Id.
287. See notes 239-49 supra and accompanying text.
288. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.40(1)(b).
289. Id.
290. Id. § 240.30(1).
291. Defense attorneys should note, however, that if they do not have such reports in
writing they risk having a very limited file on the particular client, a situation which could
come back to haunt them if later they should face a malpractice suit.
292. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.10(2).
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prosecutor, defense counsel or members of their legal staffs. '29 3 In
addition, the new article, unlike the original, specifically includes
oral statements of the defendant as discoverable on demand. 24
These two changes effectively eliminate the conflict which existed
among New York trial courts over whether oral statements and no-
tations of such statements contained in police reports were discov-
erable.2 5 Some litigation may still ensue, however, in relation to
interpretative questions involving the definition of "attorney's work
product."2 1
Police and other investigatory reports, although no longer ex-
empt property, are not made discoverable on demand by the new
article. Such reports are only discoverable by motion.2 1 In order for
such a motion to be granted, the prosecution would have to intend
to introduce them at trial and the defendant would have to show
that they were material to the preparation of his case and that the
request was reasonable.2 8 The case law dealing with the discovery
of police reports should have a significant impact in future deci-
sions in this area.99 The majority of those courts which did not al-
low discovery of police reports did so on the basis that they were
exempt property under the original article 240.300 Because police re-
ports are not within the definition of attorney's work product, 30'
such reports should be discoverable by motion if defendants can
meet the minimum requirements of materiality and
reasonableness.
Perhaps the most liberal of all the changes introduced by the
new article 240 are those relating to the discovery, upon trial, of the
293. Id.
294. Id. § 240.20(1)(a).
295. See pt. III (A) & (B)(1) supra.
296. For example, because the definition of "attorney's work product" refers only to at-
torneys and their "legal staffs," the "opinions, theories, or conclusions" of investigators and
experts are not excluded from discovery by the definition. This may invite attorneys to put
the opinions of investigators and experts in writing as their own opinions so that such mate-
rial will not be discovered. Whether the definition of "attorney's work product" will protect
such material is open to question and courts will have to come to their own conclusions as to
what the demanding or moving party must show in order to discover such material.
297. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.40(1)(b).
298. Id. Potential problems are posed by the requirement that the property discovered by
motion be that which the prosecution intends to produce at trial. See note 278 supra.
299. See pt. III B(1) supra.
300. See text accompanying notes 127-47 supra.
301. See note 293 supra and accompanying text.
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prior statements and criminal records of witnesses. 2 Here, the new
law adopts the procedure recommended in the Rice and Nicolini
cases. 0 3 That is, the section codifies and accelerates to the pretrial
stage the prosecutorial disclosure required under People v. Rosario,
where prior statements of prosecution witnesses had to be fur-
nished to the defendant at the close of the witnesses' direct testi-
mony. 01 Under the new article all prior statements of persons
whom the prosecutor intends to call at trial, including grand jury
testimony, must be made available to the defendant after the jury
has been sworn and before the prosecutor's opening statement.10 In
addition, this section promotes mutuality of discovery by providing
that statements of defendant's witnesses are to be made available
to the prosecutor after the presentation of the people's direct case
and before presentation of the defendant's direct case. 306
These new provisions adopt the approach taken by the more lib-
eral New York courts which dealt with the issues of whether and
when grand jury testimony and prior statements of potential prose-
cution witnesses could be discovered.3 7 In fact, the New York cases
which followed the exempt property provision of the original article
240 to exclude prior statements of prosecution witnesses from dis-
covery3 " are now superseded by the enactment of the new article
240 which does not include such material in its definition of "attor-
ney's work product."3"0 Indeed, the memorandum of law accompa-
nying the legislation echoes the rationale of many of the more lib-
eral cases by pointing out that "[pirolonged, repeated interruptions
of trial frequently occur under the present system [i.e., under the
original article 2401 while counsel examine these statements in
preparation for cross-examination. '310
This same section also provides for defense discovery upon trial
of a record of any judgment of conviction of or pending criminal
action against any witness the prosecution intends to call at trial.3 '
302. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.45.
303. See notes 116-26 & 180-89 supra and accompanying text.
304. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.45(1)(a).
305. Id.
306. Id. § 240.45(2).
307. See pt. III(B)(2) - (3) supra.
308. See notes 191-94 supra and accompanying text.
309. See text accompanying note 293 supra.
310. 1979 N.Y. Laws 1890 (McKinney).
311. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.45(1)(b)-(c). See text accompanying notes 144-47
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A proviso to these subsections states, to the relief of prosecutors
who foresaw problems in investigating their own witnesses, that
prosecutors are not required to fingerprint a witness, or cause any
law enforcement agency to issue a report concerning a witness. 312
The new law does not specifically provide for discovery of the
names and addresses of prospective prosecution witnesses. Presum-
ably the names of such witnesses would be discovered at the same
time as their prior statements. 13 Whether names of prosecution
witnesses can be discovered prior to this time and whether the ad-
dresses of prosecution witnesses can be discovered at all will de-
pend on whether defendants can satisfy the requirements of the
new law's section providing for discovery by motion .31 As with dis-
covery of police reports by motion, the case law dealing with the
discovery of names and addresses of witnesses will have significant
bearing on whether such information will be discoverable.3 15 Be-
cause the case law on this issue has been inconsistent, discovery of
the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses promises to be a
continuing source of litigation.
Finally the new article 240 for the first time provides that upon
the motion of the prosecutor the court may require the defendant
to appear in a line-up, speak for identification, pose for photo-
graphs, be fingerprinted, provide handwriting, blood, hair or other
materials from his body, and submit to a physical or medical ex-
amination.31 Such discovery had heretofore been "haphazard and
unregulated."3"7 The supporting memorandum states that "[u]nder
adequate court-imposed safeguards such orders will not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights."3 '
V. Conclusion
The newly enacted article 240, although resolving many of the
case law problems that arose under the original article, is still not
as liberal as it might have been. The new statute could have gone
supra.
312. Id.
313. See text accompanying note 305 supra.
314. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.40(1)(b).
315. See pt. III B(2) supra.
316. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.40(2).




further in opening up criminal discovery in New York. For exam-
ple, one fairly common defense discovery request which the new
law does not specifically include as discoverable is that for the dis-
covery and testing of drugs where the defendant has been charged
with possession of drugs. Conceivably, such drugs can be discov-
ered on demand under the section of the new law which provides
for discovery of "any other property obtained from the defen-
dant" ' and the right to make tests on such drugs can be obtained
by motion." It would have been more efficient, however, to have
expressly included both of these items as discoverable on demand.
Moreover, it would simply require a codification of a court of ap-
peals ruling which allowed for such discovery.2 '
Those who favor totally open criminal discovery will criticize the
new law for not accelerating the time for disclosure of certain mate-
rial to an even earlier stage. Most obviously the new law could have
made the names, addresses, and Rosario statements of the prosecu-
tion's potential witnesses, along with all police reports, available to
the defense upon demand. In addition, the prosecutor's entire file
could have been made available to the defendant's counsel at some
pretrial stage so that he could search it himself for any potential
Brady material. If these changes were to be instituted, however,
prosecutorial discovery on demand, a limited prosecutorial dis-
covery tool under the new article 240, would have to be given
wider scope in order for the concept of open discovery to have any
validity at all. This could be done by making the names, addresses
and prior statements of potential defense witnesses discoverable by
the prosecution on demand.
In sum, the new law does not entail major substantive change in
the law of criminal discovery. Nevertheless, it does represent an-
other step toward a more open and efficient system of criminal dis-
covery in the state of New York."'
Thomas N. Kendris
319. CPL Supp., supra note 269, § 240.20(1)(d).
320. Id. § 240.40(1)(b).
321. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1976). See also
People v. Spencer, 79 Misc. 2d 72, 361 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1974). But see People v.
Goetz, 77 Misc. 2d 319, 352 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Dutchess County Ct. 1974).
322. In approving the new law Governor Carey wrote: "It is hoped that prosecutors and
defense counsel, encouraged by the enactment of these bills, will experiment with even
broader discovery on a voluntary basis and that further discovery legislation may be devel-
oped in the near future." 1979 N.Y. Laws 1801 (McKinney).
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